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Paul G. Cassell*
The crime victim's right to deliver a "victim impact statement" at sentencing
is enshrined in the American criminal justice system. Victims have this right in all
federal sentencings and in virtually all state sentencings. Indeed, the victim's right
to speak is even protected in many state constitutions. Yet remarkably for such a
near-universal feature of criminal sentencing, the right has received virtually no
support from the legal academy. Disagreeing with the nationwide consensus, legal
academics have generally taken the view that victim impact statements are some
sort of ploy to lengthen offenders' sentences or lead to excessive emotionalism in
sentencing.
In this article, I want to suggest, at least on this issue, the public consensus is
right and the law professors are wrong. Victim impact statements have received
such widespread support because they promote justice without interfering with any
legitimate interests of criminal defendants. The statements help convey valuable
information to sentencing judges and have other beneficial effects. The benefits
are all obtained without unfairly prejudicing defendants in any tangible way.
My argument proceeds in four substantive parts. It begins in Part I by briefly
tracing the crime victims' rights movement in this country, which, in recent years,
has successfully argued for the right of victims to deliver an impact statement at
sentencing. Part II then provides a real world example of a victim impact
statement-a statement by Sue Antrobus regarding the criminal sale of the
handgun used to murder her daughter. Looking at Sue Antrobus's statement will
allow the reader to assess the desirability of victim statements with the knowledge
of what such a statement actually looks like.
Part III then lays out the four main justifications for victim impact statements.
First, they provide information to the sentencing judge or jury about the true harm
of the crime-information that the sentencer can use to craft an appropriate
penalty. Second, they may have therapeutic aspects, helping crime victims recover
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from crimes committed against them. Third, they help to educate the defendant
about the full consequences of his crime, perhaps leading to greater acceptance of
responsibility and rehabilitation. And finally, they create a perception of fairness
at sentencing, by ensuring that all relevant parties-the State, the defendant, and
the victim-are heard.
Part IV rebuts the objections that critics have raised to victim impact
statements. The claim that victim impact statements do not relate to the purposes
of punishment is refuted by the fact that they provide information about the
severity of crimes, a salient consideration for judges at sentencing. The claim that
the statements are so emotional that they will overwhelm sentencers is disproven
by empirical evidence showing little effect from victim statements on sentence
severity. The claim that victim impact statements lead to unfair inequality is
invalid in view of the need to create fairness within criminal cases by allowing a
victim response to allocution from criminal defendants and their families. And
finally, the claim that a competition of victimhood arises in mass killing cases,
even if true, provides no basis for abolishing the victim impact statements entirely.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MODERN CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
To put the debate about victim impact statements' into context, some history
may be useful. The start of the crime victims' rights movement is conventionally
placed in the 1970s, when various groups became concerned about the treatment of
victims in the nation's criminal justice system. The movement sprung from
disparate sources. "Law and order" conservatives decried the seemingly single-
minded focus of the judicial system on the rights of criminal defendants and
inattention to countervailing interests. But concern was by no means limited to the
political right. For example, advocates for the poor condemned the fact that the
government did nothing to ameliorate the financial consequences of crime on
indigent victims. The civil rights movement worried about the victims of racial
violence in the South and the inability of those victims to force effective criminal
prosecutions. And feminists criticized the treatment of rape victims, who were
often themselves placed on trial during rape prosecutions.
Responding to these groups, in the 1970s lawmakers began to enact
legislation addressing these victim-related problems in the criminal justice system.
1 In this article, I decline to use the abbreviation "VIS" for victim impact statements, finding
it to be unhelpful "initialese." See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 447
(2d ed. 1995).
2 See generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3-42 (2d ed. 2006) (describing background of the victims' rights movement);
Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims' Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005
BYU L. REV. 255; Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims' Rights Movement, 1985
UTAH L. REv. 517, 521; William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal
Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649 (1976).
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For example, legislators passed crime victims compensation schemes and rape
shield provisions. But while these progressive efforts on particular issues were
widely applauded, no comprehensive effort to review the treatment of crime
victims in the American criminal justice system was made until 1982. That year,
President Reagan appointed a task force on the victims of crime. Following public
hearings around the country, the Task Force released an influential report.
The Task Force concluded that the criminal justice system had "lost the
balance that has been the cornerstone of its wisdom"'4 and recommended various
reforms to expand the role of crime victims. Of particular interest here are the
Task Force's recommendations regarding victim impact statements. The Task
Force recommended that "[v]ictims, no less than defendants, are entitled to have
their views considered" at sentencing. 5 The Task Force, therefore, called for
legislation that would require victim impact statements at sentencing and for such a
statement to be included in all pre-sentence reports provided to judges.6 That
statement should contain information "concerning all financial, social,
psychological, and medical effects [of the crime] on the crime victim."7
The Task Force observed that the idea of victim impact statements "has been
met with resistance. That opposition and the force with which it has been
projected by judges and lawyers is one measure of their lack of concern for
victims. It is also an indication of how much is wrong with the sentencing
system."8 Objections to victim impact statements rested on two grounds: waste of
time and improper pressure on judges. With regard to the concern about time, the
Task Force responded that "[d]efendants speak and are spoken for often at great
length, before sentence is imposed. It is outrageous that the system should contend
it is too busy to hear from the victim." 9 And with regard to the concern about
unduly pressuring judges, the Task Force answered that:
The judge cannot take a balanced view if his information is acquired
from only one side. The prosecutor can begin to present the other side,
but he was not personally affected by the crime or its aftermath, and may
not be fully aware of the price the victim has paid.' °
In addition to recommending victim impact statements and other particular
reforms, the Task Force also called for an amendment to the United States
3 PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982).
4 Id. at 16.
5 Id. at 76.
6 Id. at 33, 77.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 77.
9 Id. at 77.
'0 Id. at 78.
2009]
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LA W
Constitution protecting crime victims' rights. The proposed amendment, to be
added to the Sixth Amendment, would have read: "Likewise, the victim, in every
criminal prosecution shall have the right to be present and to be heard at all critical
stages of judicial proceedings."11
The crime victims' movement's dream became to pass such a federal
constitutional amendment, which would comprehensively protect victims' rights
throughout the country. But realizing that securing such an amendment was a
daunting task, the crime victims' movement decided to organize to promote such
amendments to state constitutions. After succeeding in the states, the victims'
movement then planned to return to the task of obtaining a federal constitutional
amendment. 12
The movement had considerable success in promoting victims' rights in the
states. Beginning in 1982, thirty-two states adopted victims' rights amendments to
their own state constitutions. 13  While these amendments took varying forms,
Ohio's can serve to illustrate the types of rights protected. In 1994, Ohio voters
gave crime victims the general constitutional right to "be accorded fairness,
dignity, and respect in the criminal justice process" as well as rights to notice,
protection, and a "meaningful role in the criminal justice process." 14 In the
implementing legislation, the Ohio Legislature provided for victim impact
statements, requiring that:
(A) Before imposing sentence upon, or entering an order of disposition
for, a defendant or alleged juvenile offender for the commission of a
crime or specified delinquent act, the court shall permit the victim of
the crime or specified delinquent act to make a statement....
(B) The court shall consider a victim's statement made under division
(A) of this section along with other factors that the court is required
Id. at 114.
12 For a discussion of the history, see generally Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A
Reply to the Critics of the Victims' Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479 [hereinafter Cassell,
Reply to the Critics]; Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and the Effects of
Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373 [hereinafter Cassell, Utah's Victims'
Rights Amendment]; LeRoy L. Lamborn, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: The
Proposals for a Constitutional Amendment, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 125 (1987).
13 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; ARmZ. CONST. art. 2, § 2.1; CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 28; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a ; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8(b); FLA. CONST. art. 1, §
16(b); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.1; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13(b); KAN. CONST.
art. 15, § 15; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 25; MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 47; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; Miss.
CONST. art. 3, § 26A; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 32; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 28; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.J.
CONST. art. 1, § 22; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a;
OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 34; OR. CONST. art. I, § 42; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35; Tx. CONST. art. 1, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A;
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 35; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 9m.
14 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1Oa.
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to consider in imposing sentence or in determining the order of
disposition .... 15
The Ohio law also gave defendants a chance to respond to the victim impact
statement and to obtain a continuance, if necessary, to rebut new and material
information from the victim. 1
6
Ohio's recognition of a victim's right to give a victim impact statement is
representative of the law in all fifty states. Forty-eight states guarantee victims the
right to be heard, in some form or another, at sentencing. The remaining two allow
victim impact statements at the discretion of the sentencing judge.17
After making considerable progress to protect victims' rights at the state level,
victims' advocates decided to make an effort for federal constitutional protection
in 1995. They took the view that the state protections "frequently fail[ed] to
provide meaningful protection whenever they come into conflict with bureaucratic
habit, traditional indifference, [or] sheer inertia."' 18 To place victims' rights in the
constitution, victims' advocates (led most prominently by the National Victims'
Constitutional Amendment Network (NVCAN)) approached the President and
Congress.' 9 On April 22, 1996, Senators Jon Kyl, Orrin Hatch, and Dianne
Feinstein, with the backing of President Bill Clinton, introduced a federal victims'
rights amendment.20 The intent of the amendment was to "restore, preserve, and
protect, as a matter of right for the victims of violent crimes, the practice of victim
participation in the administration of criminal justice that was the birthright of
every American at the founding of our Nation.' The proposed amendment
protected the right to be heard, including in particular "the right to be heard at any
proceeding involving sentencing."
While the proposed Victims' Rights Amendment always had significant
backing in Congress, it could never attract the required two-thirds support. As a
result, in 2004 the victims' movement decided to instead press for a far-reaching
federal statute protecting victims' rights in the federal criminal justice system.22 In
15 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2930.14 (West 2006).
16 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2930.14(B) (West 2006).
17 The provisions are helpfully collected in Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional Implications of
Crime Victims as Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 282, 299-305 (2003) [hereinafter Beloof,
Implications].
18 Laurence H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Embed the Rights of Victims in the Constitution, L.A.
TIMES, July 6, 1998, at B5.
19 See generally Steven J. Twist, The Crime Victims' Rights Amendment and Two Good and
Perfect Things, 1999 UTAH. L. REv. 369. For more information about NVCAN, see www.nvcap.org.
20 142 CONG. REc. S3792 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
2 S. REP. No. 108-191, at 1-2 (2003); see also S. REP. No. 106-254, at 1-2 (2000).
22 Jon Kyl et al., On the Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy
Preston, Louarna Gillis, Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. Rev. 581, 584,
591 (2005).
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exchange for backing off from the federal amendment in the short term, victims'
advocates received near universal congressional support for a "broad and
encompassing" statutory victims' bill of rights.23 This "new and bolder" approach
not only created a string of victims' rights, but also provided funding for victims'
legal services and created remedies when victims' rights were violated.2 4 The
federal legislation is noteworthy here because it included (among other things) a
guaranteed right for all victims in federal cases to be "reasonably heard" at any
sentencing.25
II. AN EXAMPLE OF A VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT
As a result of these efforts by the crime victims' rights movement, it is now
virtually universal law that crime victims can deliver a victim impact statement at
sentencing. But what does such a statement actually look like? One way to
proceed would be in the arid language of a law school hypothetical. This seems
unsatisfactory, given that a considerable part of the debate about the statements
centers on their emotional content. Consider, then, a real world example of a
victim impact statement.
The example comes from my hometown of Salt Lake City, Utah. On
February 12, 2007, six persons were gunned down and many more injured in the
so-called "Trolley Square Massacre. 26 The shooter was Salejman Talovic, who
obtained two firearms and much ammunition before entering the Trolley Square
Shopping Center, intending to kill as many people as possible. Talovic obtained
one of his firearms from Mackenzie Hunter. In a hurried transaction in a parking
lot, Talovic paid $800 for a stolen handgun. Talovic had earlier asked Hunter to
help him buy the handgun because, as a juvenile, he could not buy one. When
Hunter asked Talovic why he wanted the handgun, Talovic said it was for a bank
robbery.
One of the victims of the Trolley Square massacre was Vanessa Quinn. She
was a young woman in the prime of her life. She grew up in Cincinnati, Ohio, and
was the first person in her family to earn a college degree. I realize that this article
is appearing in a Buckeye publication. But I am sure the Buckeye Nation will not
mind a favorable mention of one Cincinnati Bearcat: Vanessa Quinn was a soccer
player for the Bearcats, and reportedly, quite a good one.
23 150 CONG. REc. S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
24 Id. at S4262 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
25 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4) (2004).
2 See Trolley Square Killer, 18, Had Two Weapons, Police Say, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 13,
2007, at Al.
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vanessa Vuinn in action jor the ilearcats
After the murder of Vanessa and the other Trolley Square victims, the U.S.
Attorney's Office in Utah began a criminal investigation into how Talovic got the
guns he used to perpetrate the massacre. In May 2007, the Office indicted
Mackenzie Hunter for the illegal sale of the handgun to Talovic. The indictment
charged that Hunter knew that Talovic was a juvenile who could not lawfully
purchase handguns and, moreover, that Hunter made the sale with knowledge that
the handgun would be used in a violent crime.27 On November 1, 2007, Hunter
elected to plead guilty to a reduced misdemeanor charge-illegal sale of a handgun
to a minor, but without knowledge of how it would be used.
The next day, The Salt Lake Tribune ran an article about the desire of some of
28the crime's victims to give statements at sentencing. The article particularly
described the plight of Sue and Kenny Antrobus, Vanessa's parents. They wanted
to give a victim impact statement at Hunter's sentencing-but the U.S. Attorney's
Office thought that the court would not permit it. Coincidentally, that day was my
last day on the job as a federal district court judge-a position that I was leaving to
do pro bono crime victims' litigation. I was put in touch with the Antrobuses and
agreed to represent them pro bono in their efforts to deliver a victim impact
statement.
27 Indictment at 2, United States. v. Hunter, No. 2:07-CR-307-DAK (D. Utah May 16, 2007).
28 Lisa Rosetta & Brooke Adams, For Trolley Victims, No Day in Court, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Nov. 2, 2007, at Al.
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Sue and Kenny Antrobus, with Vanessa's husband Richard Quinn.
So here is what a victim impact statement actually looks like:
My name is Susan Antrobus[.] I am the mother of Vanessa Quinn,
who was murdered at Trolley Square Mall February 12, 2007. I am
writing this letter to you in hopes that you can understand why I feel the
need to give an impact statement on behalf of my daughter Vanessa....
How has this affected my family[?] [T]o be honest I don't know
yet, I can only tell you how it has affected us to this point in time. My
Mom gave up her fight for life, 6 weeks after Vanessa was taken from us,
and my youngest daughter Susanna had a miscarriage the same night my
Mom passed away. My husband and I cry every day, we struggle to get
through each and every day, you wake up with it, you carry it through
your day and it goes to bed with you every night. All you can do is hope
tomorrow will be a little easier [than] today. February 12 has never
ended for us; it feels like one long continuous day that will never end....
If you're old enough at 18 to give your life up for this country,
you're old enough to know what you're doing when you sell an illegal
weapon to a minor. I am asking and pleading with this court to give Mr.
Hunter the a maximum sentence to send a message to the people of this
country and people like Mr. Hunter, that if you chose to engage in illegal
weapons to minors you will be held responsible for your actions, and
maybe some people would get it....
It cost us 7,000 dollars to lay our daughter Vanessa to rest....
[Vol 6:611
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I think I deserve to give an impact statement, since Vanessa is not
here to speak for herself, I don't think 10 minutes is asking for much
considering what we've lost for a life time .... 9
Was Sue Antrobus able to give this impact statement? Before I tell you the
"rest of the story" about whether she was able to give a victim impact statement,
this example puts us in a good position to consider the main issue I want to address
in this essay-should she be able to give a victim impact statement?
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
What are the justifications for allowing victims and their representatives, 30
like Sue Antrobus, to give victim impact statements? At some level here, I may be
defending the obvious; After all, I am defending something that is the law in
virtually all fifty states and the federal system. However, it might be useful to
think systemically about the justifications for allowing victims to give impact
statements. The justifications fall into four main areas.
A. Providing Information to the Sentencer
A victim impact statement provides information to the sentencer.31 Typically
in this country, the sentencer is a judge; in a few jurisdictions, juries are given this
task,32 and in capital cases juries often determine whether to impose a death
29 Exhibit 1 to Memo in Support of Sue and Ken Antrobus' Motion to Have Vanessa Quinn
Recognized as a Crime Victim, to be Recognized as her Representative, to make an In-Court Impact
Statement, and to Receive Restitution, United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07-CR-307-DAK (D. Utah
Dec. 13, 2007).
30 In homicide cases, representatives of the murdered victim are generally allowed to exercise
the right to give a victim impact statement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (2006) ("In the case of a crime
victim who is ... deceased .... family members ... may assume the crime victim's rights .... ").
See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 2, at 61-69 (discussing victims'
representatives). In this article, I assume that the statement is presented on behalf of a specific
victim. Cf Katie Long, Note, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim 's Right or Victim's Revenge?,
75 B.U. L. REV. 187, 195-96 (1995) (discussing "community impact" statements at sentencing); Paul
H. Robinson, Should the Victims' Rights Movement Have Influence Over Criminal Law Formulation
and Adjudication?, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 749, 756-58 (2002) (individual victims are too close to
criminal cases to be able to provide objective information, but crime victims organizations might
appropriately fill that role).
31 For simplicity, in this article I will assume the victim is presenting an impact statement
about the harm of the crime, setting aside the potentially more complicated issues that arise when
victims seek to give their opinion on the proper sentence. See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST,
supra note 2, at 647-55 (discussing this issue); Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness
Sentence Recommendations in Capital Trials, 41 B.C. L. REV. 517 (2000) (same).
32 See Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (And a
Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1023-24 (2004) (collecting
examples of jury sentencing).
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sentence. These sentencers (both judges and juries) need to know the harm caused
by the criminal to determine a proper sentence. For example, the widely-cited
factors governing federal sentencing include the "seriousness of the offense."
33
Obviously more serious-i.e., more harmful--offenses require more stringent
penalties. As Professors Nadler and Rose put it, "When people make decisions
about blame and punishment, harm matters."
34
Victim impact statements provide information about the full harm of the
defendant's crime. 35 The President's Task Force on Victims of Crime concluded
that "[a] judge cannot evaluate the seriousness of a defendant's conduct without
knowing how the crime has burdened the victim." 36 It is for this reason that the
American Bar Association has endorsed victim impact statements, explaining that
"good decisions require good-and complete-information .... [I]t is axiomatic
that just punishment cannot be meted out unless the scope and nature of the deed to
be punished is before the decision-maker."
37
Examples of detailed information that a victim might provide about the
defendant's crime are legion. For example, if the defendant physically injured the
victim, the victim could describe the nature and extent of the injuries-facts that
are clearly relevant to sentencing under virtually any conceivable sentencing
scheme. The federal sentencing guidelines, for example, assign various
recommended penalties depending on whether the victim suffered "bodily injury,"
"serious bodily injury," or "permanent or life-threatening bodily injury." 38 Victims
can also provide valuable information on whether these injuries were caused
deliberately or accidentally. As the President's Task Force forcefully put it,
"Others may speculate about the defendant's potential for violence; it is the victim
who looked down the barrel of the gun, or felt his blows, or knew how serious
were the threats of death that the defendant conveyed. ' 39 For financial crimes,
victims can provide information about their losses and often can describe the
sophistication of the defendant's scheme-factors relevant to sentencing.
40
A related, secondary point is that a victim impact statement can contain
important information about restitution. Restitution is often an option at
31 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006).
34 Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of
Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 419, 420 (2003).
35 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
36 PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 3, at 76-77.
37 A.B.A. Guidelines for Fair Treatment of Crime Victims and Witnesses, 1983 A.B.A. SEC.
CRIM. JUST. 18, 21.
38 U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(3) (2007).
39 PREsuENT's TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 3, at 77-78.
40 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.1(b)(l) (2008) (increasing penalties for financial offenses based
on the loss suffered); U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9) (2008) (increasing penalties for offenses that involve
"sophisticated means"); see generally Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes,
77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 39 (2001).
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sentencing and, at least in the federal system, is required for violent crimes and
some other serious offenses. 41  This can be important for victims, like the
Antrobuses. The Antrobuses lived on an extremely limited income, yet had to pay
$7,000 in funeral expenses for Vanessa, which they covered only by pulling money
out of their very modest retirement account.
B. Benefiting the Victim
Giving information to the sentencer, as just explained, might be viewed as a
"rights-based" approach to victim impact evidence. But there are other, broader
purposes underlying victim impact statements, purposes that are supported by
"rite-based" theories. 42 As one federal district court judge put it, "[E]ven if a
victim has nothing to say that would directly alter the court's sentence, a chance to
speak still serves important purposes .... '[Victim] allocution is both a rite and a
right."'43
Giving victims a chance to participate in the rite of allocution can have
important benefits for the victim. Professor Mary Giannini observes that by
delivering a victim impact statement in court,
the victim gains access to a forum that directly and individually
acknowledges her victimhood.
The moment of sentencing is among the most public, formalized,
and ritualistic parts of a criminal case. By giving victims a clear and
uninterrupted voice at this moment on par with that of defendants and
prosecutors, a right to allocute signals both society's recognition of
victims' suffering and their importance to the criminal process.
44
There may be therapeutic aspects to a victim giving a victim impact
statement. As one victim explained the process, "The Victim Impact Statement
allowed me to construct what had happened in my mind. I could read my
thoughts.... It helped me to know that I could deal with this terrible thing."
45
Another victim said, "[W]hen I read [the victim impact statement] [in court] it
healed a part of me-to speak to [the defendant] and tell him how much he hurt
41 See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2006).
42 See Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, Defendant
Allocution, and the Crime Victims 'Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 431 (2008).
43 United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1349 (D. Utah. 2005) (quoting United
States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994)).
44 Giannini, supra note 42, at 452 (quoting Richard A. Bierschbach, Allocution and the
Purposes of Victim Participation Under the CVRA, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 44, 46-47 (2006)).
45 ELLEN K. ALEXANDER & JANICE HARRIS LORD, IMPACT STATEMENTS: A ViCTIM'S RIGHT TO
SPEAK, A NATION's REsPoNSEBELrrY TO LIsTEN 22 (1994) (quoting victim).
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me."'4 6 Still another victim reported that "I believe that I was helped by the victim
impact statement. I got to tell my step-father what he did to me. Now I can get on
with my life."47  And, if the judge acknowledges what the victim has said in the
statement, the judge's words can be (as one victim put it) "balm for her soul. 48
These healing effects are not unusual. One thorough assessment of the
literature on victim participation explained, "The cumulative knowledge acquired
from research in various jurisdictions, in countries with different legal systems,
suggests that victims often benefit from participation and input. With proper
safeguards, the overall experience of providing input can be positive and
empowering. '49 Thus, the consensus appears to be that victim impact statements
allow the victim "to regain a sense of dignity and respect rather than feeling
powerless and ashamed.
' 50
Of course, not every crime victim will benefit from being involved in the
court process. Professor Dubber has recounted the competing possibilities when
he noted that:
A victim's testimony at the sentencing hearing (orally or in writing) may
strengthen the victim's sense of self after the traumatic experience of
crime. Then, again, it may discourage the victim from reassembling
herself as a person, instead of continuing to conceive of herself as a
victim, and thus prolong the experience of criminal victimhood, rather
than help overcome it.
5 1
But no crime victim is required to deliver such a statement. Instead, the right to
speak is one that the victim can choose to exercise-or not to exercise--depending
on her assessment of whether it will be useful.
The benefits that crime victims derive from delivering victim impact
statements may be one facet of a larger movement: the "therapeutic jurisprudence"
movement. This movement contends that it is important to consider not just the
outcomes of legal processes, but the effects of the processes themselves on
participants in the legal system.5 2 The goal is to consider ways in which legal
46 Cassell, Utah's Victims'Rights Amendment, supra note 12, at 1395 n.107.
47 Id.
48 Amy Propen & Mary Lay Schuster, Making Academic Work Advocacy Work: Technologies
of Power in the Public Arena, 22 J. Bus. & TECH. CoMM. 299, 318 (2008).
49 Edna Erez, Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as Victim
Empowerment and Enhancement of Justice, CRIM. L. REv., July 1999, at 545, 550-51 [hereinafter
Erez, Big Bad Victim].
50 Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D. Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Barnard, supra note 40, at 41).
51 MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS'
RIGHTS 336 (2002).
52 See JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 6-8
(Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003).
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processes might be made agents of therapeutic change.53 Giving crime victims the
chance to deliver impact statements may well be a good example of such favorable
benefits from the process itself.
The point should not be overstated. Occasionally the claim is made that
victim impact statements will automatically bring "closure" to victims from a
crime. It is not clear that "closure" ever really occurs after a violent crime-
especially when extreme violence is at issue.54 But victim impact statements need
not deliver total closure to nonetheless be a desirable part of the criminal justice
process. Sue Antrobus would desperately like the chance to make a victim impact
statement. Unless there is some compelling countervailing concern, the system
ought to accommodate her request.
C. Explaining the Crime's Harm to the Defendant
In many jurisdictions, a victim can elect to deliver an impact statement in
open court, in the presence of not only the judge but also the defendant.55 This is a
rite that has nothing to do with the ultimate sentence imposed, but rather is a
chance for a victim "to look [the] ... defendant in the eye and let him know the
suffering his misconduct has caused. 56 As Marcus Dubber (a thoughtful critic of
victim impact statements) has conceded:
[V]ictim impact evidence lays out before the offender the precise nature
of [his] act, ideally in such a way as to permit and encourage [him] to
identify with the victim's suffering as person. In this way, victim impact
evidence can help legitimize the process of [his] punishment in the eyes
of the offender and perhaps even contribute to [his] recognition of
[himself] as one person among others entitled to mutual respect and, in
this sense, to [his] 'rehabilitation.' 57
As Dubber suggests, if a victim impact statement helps a defendant
understand and gain empathy towards the victim, it may serve as the first step
53 See generally DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISDPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990).
54 See generally Michelle Goldberg, The "Closure " Myth, SALON, Jan. 21, 2003, available at
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2003/01/21/closure/print.html ("No psychological study has
ever concluded that the death penalty brings 'closure' to anyone except the person who dies .... ");
Rethinking "Closure ", Article 3 (Murder Victims' Families for Human Rights, Cambridge, M.A.),
Fall 2008/Winter 2009, at 1-2 (arguing that "closure" does not come from executing death row
inmates).
55 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11A-2(b) (LexisNexis 2005) ("[T]he court shall permit
the victim... [to make] an oral statement [at sentencing].").
56 Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D. Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006).
57 DUBBER, supra note 51, at 338.
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towards his effective rehabilitation. A victim impact statement can thus be
justified because it may be beneficial for the offender.58 Indeed, the victim may be
ideally placed to sensitize the offender to the consequences of the crime.
. . . Because both victims and offenders are neither part of the legal
profession nor familiar with its legal jargon, a direct appeal by the victim
to the offender may be a more effective route to bring offenders to
accepting responsibility.5 9
For Sue Antrobus, this is an important reason for wanting to speak to
Mackenzie Hunter. She is not entirely convinced that he understands the
devastating effects of his crime. She wants a chance to make this clear to him,
hoping that it will keep him from committing crimes in the future.
D. Improving the Perceived Fairness of Sentencing
A final justification for victim impact statements is that they help to improve
the perceived fairness of the process. Recent victims' rights enactments
"recogniz[e] that the sentencing process cannot be reduced to a two-dimensional,
prosecution versus defendant affair. Instead, [these laws treat] sentencing as
involving a third dimension-fairness to victims-requiring that they be
'reasonably heard' at sentencing." 6 Professor Douglas Beloof has developed this
point most systematically in his influential article The Third Model of Criminal
Process: The Victim Participation Model.61 There he explains that it is no longer
appropriate to evaluate criminal justice issues solely in terms of the venerable "due
process" or "crime control" models.6 2 Instead, numerous state constitutional
amendments as well as federal and state statutes recognize that crime victims
should be given the opportunity to participate in criminal proceedings, including
sentencing proceedings.
Given the structure of contemporary criminal justice systems, fairness
requires victim impact statements. The President's Task Force on Victims of
Crime Final Report explained the point forcefully in concluding that "[w]hen the
court hears, as it may, from the defendant, his lawyer, his family and friends, his
58 See, e.g., Julian V. Roberts & Edna Erez, Communication in Sentencing: Exploring the
Expressive Function of Victim Impact Statements, 10 INT'L REV. OF VIcTIOLOGY 223, 226 (2004).
59 Edna Erez, Victim Voice, Impact Statements and Sentencing: Integrating Restorative
Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Principles in Adversarial Proceedings, 40 CRIM. L. BULL.
483, 496-97 (2004) [hereinafter Erez, Victim Voice].
60 United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1347 (D. Utah 2005) (footnote
omitted).
61 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289 [hereinafter Beloof, Third Model].
62 Id. at 290; cf HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMnrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-53 (1968)
(developing these two models).
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minister, and others, simple fairness dictates that the person who has borne the
brunt of the defendant's crime be allowed to speak., 63 Similarly, the ABA has
reasoned that "[a]llowing the victim to provide factual information to the
sentencing court about issues of relevance to the sentence is no more a play on the
sympathy of the sentencing court than allowing the defendant to provide facts
about his or her personal circumstances which may affect a just sentence. 64
The point here is not that, merely because the defendant gets to allocute, the
victim should do so as well. Such a claim might be subject to the rejoinder that the
criminal justice system gives some rights to the defendant alone. For example, the
defendant uniquely possesses a right to remain silent and the benefit of a
presumption of innocence. The point here is that the defendant is allowed to speak
at sentencing because this opportunity is critical to the legitimacy of the
proceeding.65 We allow defendants to speak at sentencing to "assure the
appearance of justice and to provide a ceremonial ritual at which society
pronounces it judgment., 66  By the same token, allowing victims the same
opportunity assures perceived fairness. In other words, victim impact evidence is
appropriate not merely because defendants have this opportunity; rather, it is
appropriate for the same reason as defendants get it.
67
In asking for the chance to give her victim impact statement in court, Sue
Antrobus knew that Mackenzie Hunter (and his attorney) would have that chance.
She simply wanted an equal opportunity to be a part of the sentencing process.
Denying her that chance would understandably reduce her acceptance-and
presumably the public's as well-of whatever sentence the judge ultimately chose
to impose in the case.
IV. THE (MISGUIDED) ATTACKS ON VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
The main justifications for victim impact statements, briefly sketched out
here, have apparently been persuasive to lawmakers around the country, as victim
impact statements are widely approved in this country.68 To truly engage the
63 PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 3, at 77.
64 A.B.A. Guidelines for Fair Treatment of Crime Victims and Witnesses, supra note 37, at 18.
65 See Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond Mitigation: Towards a Theory of Allocution, 75
FORDHAM L. REv. 2641, 2678 (2007).
66 Giannini, supra note 42, at 482 (quoting United States v. Curtis, 523 F.2d 1134, 1135 (D.C.
Cir. 1975)); see also Thomas, supra note 65, at 2672-73.
67 I am indebted to Professor Alan Michaels for this point.
68 And they are in other countries as well. On March 15, 2001, the European Union adopted a
Framework Decision on the standing of crime victims with a view to harmonizing the basic rights of
crime victims within its twenty-seven member states. See Council Framework Decision 20011220,
2001 O.J. (L 082) 1 (JHA). Specifically, the Framework Decision was designed to ensure that crime
victims play "a real and appropriate role in [the European] criminal legal system," id. at Art. 2, by
guaranteeing victims the right to participate and be heard in important criminal proceedings-
including presumably sentencings. See id. at Arts. 1-3 (requiring member states to "safeguard the
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subject, it is perhaps more useful to evaluate the arguments of those who would
alter the status quo by abolishing victim impact statements.
In focusing on these substantive concerns, I do not mean to overlook possible
procedural questions about how courts should receive victim impact testimony.
Given that victim impact statements can lead judges to pronounce more severe
sentences on criminal defendants, due process considerations may require that
defendants be allowed some opportunity to challenge factual information found in
those statements. But this procedural question about how to resolve disputed facts
raised by victims strikes me as a question of detail. Sentencing procedures can
always be adjusted to provide whatever level of procedural fairness is appropriate
for defendants. 69 Existing procedures typically allow defendants to challenge any
disputed material fact at sentencing,70 presumably giving defendants the ability to
challenge factual claims made by victims in their statements. In Ohio, for
example, the relevant statute explicitly gives the defendant an opportunity to
respond to the victim impact statement and to obtain a continuance if necessary to
rebut new and material information from the victim. 71 As another example, in
federal capital cases, the defendant is given the opportunity "to rebut any
information received at the [penalty] hearing, and shall be given fair opportunity to
present argument" against the death penalty.72
Rather than ponder the more technical question of how to administer victim
impact statements, I would like to address the overarching question of whether to
allow such statements at all. Consider, then, the arguments that have been raised
against victims speaking at sentencing.
possibility for victims to be heard during proceedings and to supply evidence" and broadly defining
"proceedings"). European countries are now moving forward in this direction. See, e.g., James
Chalmers et al., Victim Impact Statements: Can Work, Do Work (For Those Who Bother to Make
Them), CRIM. L. REv., May 2007, at 360 (describing Scottish program); Roberts & Erez, supra note
58, at 224 (noting victim impact rights in Wales and England). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, MIXED RESULTS: U.S. POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON THE RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS OF VICTIMS OF CRIME 25-27 (2008) (discussing international human rights agreements
recognizing crime victims' rights to participate in criminal proceedings).
69 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 861, 936-37 (discussing protections for
defendants in responding to victim impact statements in the federal system).
70 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 (2008) (stating that the parties "shall be given an adequate
opportunity to present information" as to any sentencing factor "reasonably in dispute").
71 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2930.14 (LexisNexis 2006) (giving the defendant an opportunity
to respond to the victim impact statement and allowing him or her to obtain a continuance if
necessary to rebut new and material information from the victim).
72 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000).
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A. The Claim that Victim Impact Statements Do Not Relate to the Purposes of
Punishment
Perhaps the most commonly advanced attack on victim impact statements is
the claim that they are unrelated to the purposes of punishment. The argument is
that victim impact statements present the mere feelings or emotions of crime
victims, which do not bear on the blameworthiness of a criminal's actions or the
severity with which he should be punished.
A prominent example of this argument comes from the Supreme Court's 1987
decision, Booth v. Maryland.73 This capital case arose from the robbery and
murder of an elderly couple, Irvin Bronstein and his wife Rose. John Booth and an
accomplice entered the Bronstein's home to steal money. Booth was a neighbor of
the Bronsteins and knew that the couple could identify him. So he bound and
gagged them, then repeatedly stabbed both of them in the chest with a kitchen
knife. The Bronstein's son discovered their bodies two days later.
A jury found Booth guilty of two counts of first degree murder, and the
prosecutor sought the death penalty. The probation officer prepared a written
victim impact statement about the Bronsteins and about the impact of the crime on
their surviving family members. Their son, for example, said that he suffered from
lack of sleep and depression. Their granddaughter described how the murders
ruined the wedding of a close family member; shortly after the wedding, instead of
leaving on a honeymoon, the bride attended a funeral.74
The probation officer concluded the report with a note on the permanent
impact on the surviving family members:
It became increasingly apparent to the writer as she talked to the family
members that the murder of Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein is still such a
shocking, painful, and devastating memory to them that it permeates
every aspect of their daily lives. It is doubtful that they will ever be able
to fully recover from this tragedy and not be haunted by the memory of
the brutal manner in which their loved ones were murdered and taken
from them.75
The victim impact statement was read to the jury, and it returned a death sentence.
A challenge to the victim impact statement ultimately reached the Supreme Court.
Justice Powell wrote a 5-4 decision finding the reading of the victim impact
statement improper and reversing the death penalty. The centerpiece of his
opinion was a passage finding that the statement was not related to any proper
purpose of punishment:
73 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
74 Id. at 500.
75 Id. (quoting from the record) (internal citation omitted).
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The focus of a [victim impact statement] is not on the defendant, but on
the character and reputation of the victim and the effect on his family.
These factors may be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a
particular defendant. As our cases have shown, the defendant often will
not know the victim, and therefore will have no knowledge about the
existence or characteristics of the victim's family.76
Before turning to the merits of Justice Powell's claim, one exceedingly
curious aspect of the decision is worth noting. Reasoning from the premise that
"death is different," Justice Powell limited the Court's prohibition of victim impact
statements to capital cases because "the considerations that inform the [capital]
sentencing decision may be different from those that might be relevant to other
liability or punishment determinations. 77 Justice Powell went on to observe that
36 states and the federal system allowed victim impact statements in non-capital
settings and that the Court was expressing no view on these uses. But if, as Justice
Powell asserted, victim impact statements truly deal with factors "wholly unrelated
to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant," 78 that logic does not stop with
first degree murder. Rather, it would extend likewise to forbid victim impact
evidence in cases of second degree murder, rape, robbery, fraud, pickpocketing,
and any other crime one could think of. Even accepting the premise that "death is
different," the question remains: how is the death penalty context different and in
some way relevant to the admission of victim impact evidence? 79 Just as a death
sentence cannot be revoked, neither can a five-year prison sentence that has been
served.80 And surely both sentences should be based on evidence related to the
culpability of the defendant. Justice Powell's unjustified limitation of the reach of
his decision gave the impression that it ultimately rested on animus to death
sentences, not on the unreliability of victim evidence. As Professor George
Fletcher put it, basing a sentence on a defendant's blameworthiness "is a sound
principle for all criminal cases, but one that seems compelling to the Court only
when the stakes are life and death."'"
76 Id. at 504. For a more academic presentation of the same argument, see Lynne N.
Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937, 986-1006 (1985) (outlining why
goals of criminal statements do not support victim participation in sentencing).
77 Booth, 482 U.S. at 509 n.12.
78 Id. at 505.
79 Cf Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process
for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1162 n.67 (1980) ("It is difficult to capture what is involved in
the notion that death is different.").
80 See JEFFRE G. MURPJHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 240 (1979). See generally
Daniel Suleiman, Note, The Capital Punishment Exception: A Case for Constitutionalizing the
Substantive Criminal Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 447-51 (2004) (collecting objections to the
"death is different" slogan).
81 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 199
(1995). Cf Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials; the Trouble with Us, 105 YALE L.J. 825,
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More fundamentally, Justice Powell was simply wrong to maintain that victim
impact statements are unrelated to the blameworthiness of a defendant. To
demonstrate the point, it is useful to consider what factors courts and legislators
conventionally consider when determining the seriousness of an offense. A good
statement of the basic principles is found in Professor Joshua Dressler's handy
treatise, Understanding Criminal Law. There he notes that, in establishing
criminal penalties, "The lawmaker must determine the harmfulness of each
offense, taking into consideration the immediate victim, family members, and
society as a whole. 82  Thus, as set out by Professor Dressler, harmfulness-
including harm to "the immediate victim" and "family members" -is obviously
and uncontroversially a driving factor in making blameworthiness decisions. The
debate about victim impact statements, therefore, devolves to whether they help
the sentencer determine such an offense's harm. If they do shed light on harm,
they relate to the purposes of punishment.
To see whether a victim impact statement sheds light on harm, consider Sue
Antrobus's statement. Would the sentencer in that case have learned nothing from
hearing what it has been like for her and her family since the murder of Vanessa
Quinn? My own assessment is that her statement would be quite helpful in
formulating an appropriate sentence, as it shows the full consequences of the
defendant's crime. Without such information, a judge may get a distorted picture
of what happened.83 Indeed, having seen a fair number of victim impact
statements as a federal district court judge, my impression is that it would be quite
rare for a judge or juror to learn nothing new about the loss caused by the crime
from reading a victim impact statement.
Any reader who disagrees with me should take a simple test: Read an actual
victim impact statement from a serious crime all the way through, and see if you
truly learn nothing new about the enormity of the loss.84 Sadly, the reader will
have no shortage of such victim impact statements to choose from. Actual impact
statements from court proceedings are accessible in various places.85 Other
848-49 (1995) (book review) (noting differences between victim participation in capital and non-
capital sentencings and concluding that "wholesale condemnation of victim participation under all
circumstances is surely unwarranted").
82 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 57 (4th ed. 2006) (emphasis added).
83 See Brooks Douglass, Oklahoma's Victim Impact Legislation: A New Voice for Victims and
Their Families: A Response to Professor Coyne, 46 OKLA. L. REv. 283, 289 (1993) (offering example
of jury denied truth about full impact of a crime).
84 My argument here is a slight revision of the argument I presented in Cassell, Reply to the
Critics, supra note 12, at 488-89.
85 See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509-15 (1987) (attaching impact statement to
opinion); Official Trial Transcript, United States v. Nichols, No. 96-CR-68 (D. Colo. Dec. 29, 1997),
1997 WL 790551 (containing various victim impact statements at sentencing of Terry Nichols);
Official Trial Transcript, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68 (D. Colo. June 5, 1997), 1997 WL
296395 (containing various victim impact statements at sentencing of Timothy McVeigh); Speaking
Out for the Victims, AM. LAW, Mar. 1995, at 54, 54-55 (statement by Federal Judge Michael Luttig at
the sentencing of his father's murderers).
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examples can be found in moving essays written by family members who have lost
a loved one to a murder and who have had that loved one suffer a serious violent
crime. A powerful example is the collection of statements from families
devastated by the Oklahoma City bombing, collected in Marsha Kight's affecting
Forever Changed. Remembering Oklahoma City, April 19, 1995.86 Kight's
compelling book is not unique, as equally powerful accounts from the family of
Ron Goldman, 87 children of Oklahoma City,88 Alice Kaminsky, 89 George Lardner
Jr.,90 Dorris Porch and Rebecca Easley, 9' Mike Reynolds,92 family of Elizabeth
Smart,93 Deborah Spungen,94 John Walsh,95 and Marvin Weinstein96 make all too
painfully clear. Intimate third-party accounts offer similar insights about the
generally unrecognized, yet far-reaching consequences of homicide and other
serious crimes.
97
A recent empirical study of state trial judges confirms that victim impact
statements can convey new information about a crime's harm. Professors Amy
Propen and Mary Lay Schuster interviewed twenty-eight Minnesota trial judges in
2004 to 2006, reporting the judges' views on what made victim statements
"persuasive." 98  Persuasive statements included those that "provide new
information on a case .... display insight into the crime or relationship with the
defendant, or offer a vivid account of the crime that distinguishes it from the
86 MARSHA KIGHT, FOREVER CHANGED: REMEMBERING OKLAHOMA CITY, APRIL 19, 1995
(1998).
87 THE FAMILY OF RON GOLDMAN WITH WILLIAM & MARILYN HOFFER, His NAME IS RON
(1997).
88 NANCY LAMB & CHILDREN OF OKLAHOMA CITY, ONE APRIL MORNING: CHILDREN
REMEMBER THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING (1996).
89 ALICE R. KAMINSKY, THE VICTIM'S SONG (1985).
90 GEORGE LARDNER, JR., THE STALKING OF KRISTIN: A FATHER INVESTIGATES THE MURDER OF
His DAUGHTER (1995).
91 DORRIS D. PORCH & REBECCA EASLEY, MURDER IN MEMPHIS: THE TRUE STORY OF A
FAMILY'S QUEST FOR JUSTICE (1997).
92 MIKE REYNOLDS & BILL JONES WITH DAN EVANS, THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT! ... A
PROMISE TO KIMBER: THE CHRONICLE OF AMERICA'S TOUGHEST ANTI-CRIME LAW (1996).
93 ED & LOIS SMART WITH LAURA MORTON, BRINGING ELIZABETH HOME: A JOURNEY OF FAITH
AND HOPE (2003).
94 DEBORAH SPUNGEN, AND I DON'T WANT TO LIVE THIS LIFE (1983).
95 JOHN WALSH WITH SUSAN SCHINDEHETrE, TEARS OF RAGE: FROM GRIEVING FATHER TO
CRUSADER FOR JUSTICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE ADAM WALSH CASE (1997).
96 MILTON J. SHAPIRO WITH MARVIN WEINSTEIN, WHO WILL CRY FOR STACI? THE TRUE
STORY OF A GRIEVING FATHER'S QUEST FOR JUSTICE (1995).
97 See, e.g., GARY KINDER, VICTIM (1982); JANICE HARRIS LORD, No TIME FOR GOODBYES:
COPING WITH SORROW, ANGER AND INJUSTICE AFTER A TRAGIC DEATH (4th ed. 1991); SHELLEY
NEIDERBACH, INVISIBLE WOUNDS: CRIME VICTIMS SPEAK (1986); DEBORAH SPUNGEN, HOMICIDE: THE
HIDDEN VICTIMS xix-xxiii (1998); JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE ONION FIELD (1973).
98 Propen & Schuster, supra note 48.
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typical or average crime of its sort."'99 One of the interviewed judges gave the
example of a statement that caused him to "learn of the victim's injury and impact
in ... several dimensions that have never been flashed before my brain before...
,100 The study's authors thus concluded that "[t]he most persuasive impact
statements seem to be those in which the victim describes relationship dynamics,
in domestic assault cases, and personal accounts, in other crimes, that the judge
would otherwise be unable to see or understand."'1 1
The educative effects of victim impact statements have been shown in other
ways as well. Professor Edna Erez had found that "legal professionals [in South
Australia] who have been exposed to [victim impact statements] have commented
on how uninformed they were about the extent, variety and longevity of various
victimizations, and how much they have learned... about the impact of crime on
victims .... ,102 Similarly, a mock juror study found that the level of harm
expressed in the victim impact statement, and not the emotional state of the
witnesses, affected sentencing judgments.'0 3
Four years after the Booth decision, the Supreme Court agreed that victim
impact statements help educate sentencers about harm and overruled its earlier
prohibition on all victim impact evidence.1°4 In Payne v. Tennessee, the Court
concluded: "Victim impact evidence is simply another form or method of
informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in
question, evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing authorities.' 10 5
As explained by the Court and several concurring Justices, homicide is a crime that
has foreseeable consequences-not only the death of an individual, but disruption
of the web of life. For example, Justice Souter in a concurring opinion explained:
The fact that the defendant may not know the details of a victim's life
and characteristics . . . should not in any way obscure the further facts
that death is always to a 'unique' individual, and harm to some group of
survivors is a consequence of a successful homicidal act so foreseeable
as to be virtually inevitable. 06
99 Id. at 315.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Erez, Big Bad Victim, supra note 49, at 554.
103 Bryan Myers, Steven Jay Lynn & Jack Arbuthnot, Victim Impact Testimony and Juror
Judgments: The Effects of Harm Information and Witness Demeanor, 32 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL.
2393 (2002). Because this is a study of mock jurors, questions arise about its applicability to real-
world sentencing decisions. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
104 Whether Payne also effectively overruled Booth's prohibition of a victim's
recommendations on sentence remains an open question. See BELOOF, CASSELL, & TWIST, supra note
3, at 647-55 (collecting materials on this issue).
'O5 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
106 Id. at 838 (Souter, J., concurring).
2009]
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LA W
These arguments are compelling. Victim impact statements reveal
information about the crime-and particularly about the harm of a crime-which
makes them quite relevant to a core purpose of sentencing: ensuring that the
punishment fits the crime. Proper punishment cannot be meted out unless judges
and juries know the dimensions of the crime and the harm it has caused. Victim
impact statements educate them about these salient facts so that they can impose an
appropriate sentence.
B. The Claim that Victim Impact Evidence Is So Emotional That It Will Overwhelm
Sentencers
The next objection to victim impact evidence is almost at odds with the one
just discussed. Some critics have taken the position that, far from being irrelevant,
victim impact statements are almost too relevant-i.e., they are such powerful
evidence at sentencing that they overwhelm judges and juries. Some critics have
even gone so far as to refer to the idea of victim impact as the "pollution" of
sentencings with emotion. 10 7 Professor Susan Bandes, who may be the nation's
leading scholar on emotion and the law, has put the claim this way:
• ..[S]tudies suggest that victim impact evidence, particularly when it
conveys intense emotional pain, evokes sympathy and anger in jurors.
Jurors perceive greater suffering after hearing such statements, and hear
the emotional intensity of the statements as "a cry for help or relief."
There is evidence that the anger they feel upon hearing victim impact
statements translates into feelings of punitiveness. There is also
evidence, more generally, that anger tends to interfere with the sound
judgment-it inhibits detailed information processing, increases
tendencies to blame, including misattributions of blame, and exacerbates
the urge to punish. 10
8
In attacking victim impact statements for producing improper emotions,
Professor Bandes is careful not to attack the strawman of emotional outbursts in
107 See Erez, Victim Voice, supra note 59, at 484 (noting this description by English
commentators).
108 Susan Bandes, Victims, "Closure, " and the Sociology of Emotion, 21 (Univ. of Chi. Law
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 208, 2008) [hereinafter Bandes,
Victims], available at http://ssrn.cornabstract=l 112140 (footnotes omitted). This article will shortly
be published in 72 Law and Contemporary Problems (forthcoming 2009). For other interesting
works by Bandes on emotion and the law, see SusAN BANDES, THE PASSIONS OF LAW (2001); Susan
Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. C1. L. REv. 361 (1996)
[hereinafter Bandes, Empathy]. For a similar argument to Bandes', see Bruce A. Arrigo &
Christopher R. Williams, Victim Vices, Victim Voices, and Impact Statements: On the Place of
Emotion and the Role of Restorative Justice in Capital Sentencing, 49 CRIM. & DELNQ. 603 (2003).
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the courtroom. A victim or surviving family member who jumps up in the middle
of a hearing to blurt out some assertion is subject to the control of a trial judge no
less than disruptive defendants.1°9 Nor does Professor Bandes parade out a few
isolated examples of overwhelming evidence. Such illustrations would be subject
to the rejoinder that, with victim impact evidence no less than other evidence, the
trial judge retains discretion to screen out extremely prejudicial testimony." 0 In
the Oklahoma City bombing trial, for example, the trial judge excluded testimony
about the gruesome process through which victims identified the mangled bodies
of their loved ones, evidence about a father's poem about his dead child, and a
photograph of a mother releasing a dove in lieu of a funeral because her child's
body was not yet found, on grounds that they were overwhelmingly
prejudicial."' The point here is not that the trial judge reached the right ruling on
these particular issues, as powerful arguments (by Professor Laurence Tribe,
among others) have been raised against these specific rulings. 1 2 Rather, the point
is that there will be some extreme cases of victim impact evidence that may have
to be dealt with through doctrines regulating excessive prejudice. In steering clear
of such oddities, Professor Bandes raises a fair critique of the emotional content of
a properly presented, "normal" victim impact statement.
Professor Bandes, however, apparently limits her argument to capital cases," 3
again raising the question of consistency. Is she conceding that the great bulk of
victim impact statements, delivered in non-capital cases, are proper?14 But even
with regard to capital cases, Bandes' reasoning is flawed. She begins with what
she evidently regards as a damning premise-that "[j]urors perceive greater
109 See Beloof, Implications, supra note 17, at 294-95.
"10 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (Supp. V 2005) (stating that at a federal capital sentencing
hearing, the trial judge may exclude testimony "if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of
creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury").
111 Reporter's Transcript, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68 (D. Colo. June 3, 1997),
http://www.cnn.com/US/9703/okc.trial/transcripts/june/060397.am.txt.
112 See Laurence H. Tribe, McVeigh's Victims Had a Right to Speak, N.Y. TIMEs, June 9,
1997, at A25, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=94O1E3D6173CF93AA35755COA961958260. But
see Richard Burr, Litigating with Victim Impact Testimony: The Serendipity that Has Come from
Payne v. Tennessee, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 517, 518-26 (2003) (arguments from McVeigh's defense
attorney that too much impact testimony was allowed).
113 See Bandes, Victims, supra note 108, at 5.
114 In an e-mail to me, Professor Bandes makes the point more explicitly but adds a note of
explanation: "[Y]es, I am speaking only about capital punishment, and that's precisely my point...
that context matters. I have considered victim impact statements and the emotions they evoke in the
context of a trial with a guilt phase and a penalty phase-and the particular emotional dynamics of
that proceeding. I am arguing for a more careful teasing out of the things survivors actually need or
expect from victim impact statements so we can figure out whether the legal system can provide them
.... " E-mail from Professor Susan Bandes to Professor Paul Cassell (Sept. 16, 2008) (on file with
author). I continue to wonder how the "context" of a capital trial can be so completely different from
those of other trials as to warrant a ban on a commonly-used form of evidence-victim impact
evidence.
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suffering after hearing such statements . . . .1' But this is precisely the point.
Listening to victim impact evidence is how jurors begin to comprehend the full
harm that a homicide causes. Professor Bandes goes on to reason that the jurors'
perceptions of suffering "translate[] into feelings of punitiveness."' 16 But this is
seemingly just a fancy way of saying that crimes with more serious harm will be
punished more severely. Nothing is wrong with that. If, for example, the federal
district court judge had heard Sue Antrobus's victim impact statement and decided
that the illegal gun sale had more serious consequences than he had previously
appreciated, the fact that he imposed a longer sentence would not be proof that the
system was working, not failing.
In my view, Bandes needs to more carefully distinguish between prejudice
and unfair prejudice from a victim's statement. It is a commonplace of evidence
law that a litigant is not entitled to exclude harmful evidence, but only unfairly
harmful evidence.' 17 Bandes appears to believe that a sentence imposed following
a victim impact statement rests on unjustified prejudice or "undifferentiated
vengeance."' 118 But one might just as easily conclude that the sentence rests on a
fuller understanding of all of the murder's harmful ramifications.
Professor Bandes's argument is also carefully hedged. Thus, she writes that
"studies suggest" certain potential consequences and that "there is evidence that"
jurors may do certain things. These hedges are all required a difficult fact for those
who criticize victim impact statements on grounds of its effects on sentencers:
good evidence that victim impact statements generally lead to harsher sentences is
lacking.
The evidence on the effect of victim impact evidence in capital cases is very
slim. In a 1999 law review article in the Utah Law Review, I surveyed the
available empirical evidence on actual capital cases and found no significant effect
on the outcome of capital cases." 9 There is some tentative suggestion in simulated
juror studies that victim impact statements might have an effect on death penalty
decisions. 120 But whether simulation studies can provide useful insights into the
115 Bandes, Victims, supra note 108, at 21.
116 Id.
117 See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 403 (permitting evidence to be excluded based on significant risk of
"unfair prejudice"). See generally MANGRUM & BENSON ON UTAH EVIDENCE 135-36 (2007-08 ed.)
(distinguishing between the concepts of "prejudice" and "unfair prejudice").
"18 Bandes, Empathy, supra note 108, at 396.
"19 Cassell, Reply to the Critics, supra note 12, at 491-92.
120 See Edith Greene, The Many Guises of Victim Impact Evidence and Effects on Jurors'
Judgments, 5 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 331, 334 (1999) (discussing mock jury research); Edith Greene,
Heather Koehring & Melinda Quiat, Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases: Does the Victim's
Character Matter?, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 145 (1998) (finding support for hypothesis that
victim impact evidence would affect jurors' capital sentencing decisions); James Luginbuhl &
Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital Trial: Encouraging Votes for Death, 20 AM.
J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (1995) (finding support for hypothesis that victim impact evidence would increase
jurors' votes for death penalty). But cf Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The Effects of Physical
Attractiveness, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Gender of Defendants and Victims on Judgments of
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operation of real world juries, particularly juries making life or death decisions, is
open to question.1
2
'
In any event, simulation research is clearly a second-best choice to research
about actual jurors' decision making. Recently Professor Ted Eisenberg and his
colleagues at Cornell gathered data about actual capital cases by interviewing over
two-hundred jurors who sat on capital trials in South Carolina between 1985 and
2001. These researchers found no link to death sentences, concluding: "We find
[no] significant relation between the introduction of [victim impact evidence] and
11122sentencing outcomes.
Moving to the larger body of research on the effect of victim impact
statements on non-capital sentences, the empirical evidence also finds little effect
on sentence severity. For example, a study in California concluded that "[tihe
right to allocution at sentencing has had little net effect . . . on sentences in
general.' 23  A study in New York similarly reported "no support for those who
argue against [victim impact] statements on the grounds that their use places
defendants in jeopardy." 124 A careful scholar recently reviewed all of the available
Mock Jurors: A Meta-Analysis, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1315 (1994) (finding, through meta-
analysis of previous research, that "[e]ffects of victim characteristics on juror's judgments were
generally inconsequential"); Bryan Myers et al., Victim Impact Statements and Mock Juror
Sentencing: The Impact of Dehumanizing Language on a Death Qualified Sample, 22 AM. J.
FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 39 (2004) [hereinafter Myers et al., Victim Impact] (finding that mock jurors who
read a statement dehumanizing a defendant were more likely to impose a death sentence, but that this
result was not statistically significant). For a good overview of the many open questions in the
psychological literature, see generally Bryan Myers et al., Psychology Weighs In on the Debate
Surrounding Victim Impact Statements and Capital Sentencing: Are Emotional Jurors Really
Irrational?, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 13 (2006) [hereinafter Myers et. al., Psychology].
121 See Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 705-06 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that there is little "a priori
reason" to think short simulation studies would offer insight into abilities of real juries who spend
days and weeks becoming familiar with the facts of a case); Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the
'Innocent': An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523, 600 n.454 (1999); Myers et al., Psychology, supra note 120, at 17
("The decisions participants in a jury simulation make hold no real consequences, and so it is difficult
to extrapolate the findings to real capital trials where the consequences are so grave."). The concerns
about the realism of mock jury research apply with particular force to emotionally-charged death
penalty verdicts. See Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury Decision Making in the Capital Penalty
Phase: Legal Assumptions, Empiracal Findings, and a Research Agenda, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 185,
191 (1992) ("[T]he very nature of the [death] penalty decision may render it an inappropriate topic
for jury simulation studies.").
122 Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence in South
Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 308 (2003).
123 EDWIN VILLMOARE & VIRGINIA N. NEro, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
EXECUTivE SUMMARY, VICTIM APPEARANCES AT SENTENCING HEARINGS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA
VICTIMs' BILL OF RIGHTS 61 (1987) [hereinafter NU SENTENCING STUDY].
124 Robert C. Davis & Barbara E. Smith, The Effects of Victim Impact Statements on
Sentencing Decisions: A Test in an Urban Setting, 11 JUST. Q. 453, 466 (1994); accord ROBERT C.
DAVIS ET AL., VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS: THEIR EFFECTS ON COURT OUTCOMES AND VICTIM
SATISFACTION 68 (1990) (concluding that the result of the study "lend[s] support to advocates of
victim impact statements" since no evidence indicates that these statements "put[] defendants in
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evidence in this country and elsewhere, and concluded that "sentence severity has
not increased following the passage of [victim impact] legislation."' 25
So if there is no effect on sentences, some may question why we should
bother with victim impact statements at all? 126 But recall the justifications for
victim impact statements set out earlier in this article. They made no instrumental
claims about how sentences might be changed, but rather relied on other
justifications such as fairness and therapeutic effects on victims. Put another way,
victim impact statements are not (as some critics seem to assume) a ploy to more
harshly punish defendants, but rather a procedural device with other aims.
Professor Edna Erez has explained the point nicely:
Influencing the sentence, however, has never been an explicit or implicit
purpose of [victim impact statement] legislation. At best, advocates
hoped that details about victim harm would have beneficial side effects
such as contributing to sentence commensurability. Historically, and at
the present, the primary function of the [victim impact statement]
legislation has been expressive or therapeutic-to provide crime victims
with a "voice," regardless of any impact it may have on sentencing.
127
Moreover, even if victim impact statements lead to harsher penalties in
general or to a longer sentence in a particular case, that would hardly provide a
convincing reason for banning them. When Professor Bandes contends that victim
statements "[translate] into feelings of punitiveness,"'1 8 she is implicitly assuming
that this greater punitiveness is somehow improper. But one could just as easily
say that excluding victim impact evidence might "translate into feelings of mercy."
Without a baseline for telling us whether punitiveness or mercy is proper, no
reason exists to prefer one legal regime over the other. Professor David Friedman
has suggested this conclusion, observing:
If the legal rules present the defendant as a living, breathing human
being with loving parents weeping on the witness stand, while presenting
jeopardy [or] result in harsher sentences").
125 Erez, Big Bad Victim, supra note 49, at 548; see also Edna Erez, Victim Participation in
Sentencing: And the Debate Goes On .... 3 INT'L REV. OF VICTMOLOGY 17, 22 (1994); cf Propen &
Schuster, supra note 48, at 315 (reporting that the most common effect of impact statements is to
make changes at the margins, such as "affect[ing] the conditions of probation, causing the judge to
order anger-management treatment, drug and alcohol supervision, domestic violence counseling, or
such.").
l2 See Andrew Sanders et al., Victim Impact Statements: Don't Work, Can't Work, 2001
CgiM. L. REv. 447 (raising this argument in connection with pilot victim impact regimes in England
and Wales).
127 See Erez, Victim Voice, supra note 59, at 490-91 (citation omitted); see also Chalmers et
al., supra note 68, at 371-72.
18 Bandes, Victims, supra note 108, at 21.
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the victim as a shadowy abstraction, the result will be to overstate, in the
minds of the jury, the cost of capital punishment relative to the benefit.129
Correcting this misimpression is not distorting the decision-making process, but
eliminating a distortion that would otherwise occur.' 30 This interpretation meshes
with empirical studies in non-capital cases suggesting that, if a victim impact
statement makes a difference in punishment, the description of the harm sustained
by the victims is the crucial factor.
13
Even apart from debating the empirical effects of the emotion conveyed by
victim impact statements, a more fundamental response is possible: What's wrong
with emotion? Professors Douglas Berman and Stephanos Bibas have recently
made this point nicely when they explain:
When a wild animal threatens us, we do not judge or condemn it.
We may incapacitate it or scare it off, but it is ludicrous to be angry at a
shark or a tree for killing someone. Animals, plants, and objects are not
moral agents....
We are angry at moral agents because we acknowledge that they
had the freedom to choose and chose wrongly. Anger recognizes and
respects their freedom, holding them accountable for their choices. Our
anger reflects our care for our victimized fellow man and our outrage at
the criminal who should have known better. Anger underscores the
moral community we share with victims and criminals. Crimes have torn
the social fabric and demand justice, payback to condemn the crime,
vindicate the victim, and denounce the wrongdoer. Where there is no
anger, there is no justice and no sense of community. Grave moral
wrongs demand righteous indignation and action. Executing Adolf
Eichmann was hardly necessary to incapacitate or deter him, but it was
essential to condemn the Holocaust and vindicate its victims.
32
129 David D. Friedman, Should the Characteristics of Victims and Criminals Count?: Payne v.
Tennessee and Two Views of Efficient Punishment, 34 B.C. L. REv. 731, 749 (1993).
130 See id. (reasoning that the Payne rule "can be interpreted... as a way of reminding the jury
that victims, like criminals, are human beings with parents and children, lives that matter to
themselves and others").
131 See, e.g., Edna Erez & Pamela Tontodonato, The Effect of Victim Participation in
Sentencing on Sentence Outcome, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 451, 469 (1990); see also Propen & Schuster,
supra note 48, at 316, 315 (reporting that judges want a victim impact statement presented "in a
balanced tone that is not overly emotional" and that the most persuasive statements included those
that "provide new information on a case. . . or offer a vivid account of the crime that distinguishes it
from the typical or average crime of its sort").
132 Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital Emotions, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 355, 360 (2008), http:llwww.law.northwestem.edulawreviewlcolloquy/200817 (citation
omitted); cf Susan A. Bandes, Child Rape, Moral Outrage, and the Death Penalty, 103 Nw. U.L.
REv. COLLOQUY 17, 28 (2008) [hereinafter Bandes, Child Rape],
http:l/www.law.northwestem.edulawreviewlcolloquy/2008/27 (responding to Berman and Bibas,
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As Berman and Bibas suggest, some emotion is inherently desirable in a
criminal process. Indeed, if we were to attempt to move to an emotionless system
of criminal justice, perhaps the biggest losers might be criminal defendants.
Defendants, defense attorneys, and family members frequently make emotional
pleas at sentencing for mercy, pleas that the law routinely allows. Their pleas, no
less than the pleas of victims, are a proper part of the criminal justice system.
C. The Claim that Victim Impact Statements Lead to Unjustified Inequality
The next attack on victim impact statements is that they can lead to unjustified
inequality. Eloquent victims and their families, the argument goes, will obtain
longer sentences for the defendants in their cases than will less eloquent victims.
Thus, as one author has claimed, to permit victim impact evidence is to essentially
say "Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People." 133 Professor Joe Hoffman has laid out
the argument clearly:
[V]ictim impact evidence encourages capital sentences to base their
sentencing decisions on the individual characteristics of the victim,
which leads to the imposition of different punishments for similar
crimes, depending on the perceived value of the respective victims....
... [I]t [also] allows for disparate treatment of defendants based on the
relative articulateness and persuasiveness of the survivors. 134
This claim, too, founders on the problem that the empirical evidence simply
does not provide proof that victim impact statements (articulate or otherwise)
but conceding that emotional responses to crimes need to be taken "very seriously").
133 Amy K. Phillips, Note, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of Victim
Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 93 (1997).
134 Joseph L. Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy? Some Thoughts About Survivor Opinion
Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 530, 532-33 (2003); see also Donald J. Hall,
Victims' Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint, 28 AM. CRJM. L. REv. 233, 235 (1991)
(arguing that "the fundamental evil" associated with victim statements is "disparate sentencing of
similarly situated defendants").
A variant on the inequality objection to victim impact evidence is that it will lead to
"comparative worth" arguments by prosecutors seeking a death sentence, i.e., that a defendant should
be sentenced to death because his life is worth less than the life of the murder victim. See generally
Erin McCampbell, Note, Tipping the Scales: Seeking Death Through Comparative Value Arguments,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 379 (2006). The constitutionality of such arguments remains an unsettled
question. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding over vigorous
dissent that a comparative worth argument did not violate clearly established precedent). I do not
view comparative worth arguments as a valid objection to victim impact evidence. Even assuming
that such arguments are constitutional, prosecutors can easily make them in any case whether or not
victim impact evidence has been introduced.
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generally change real world sentences. 135 Without such proof, it is simply not true
that victim impact statements lead to different punishments for similar crimes.
But let us assume that the next empirical study convincingly documents some
demonstrated lengthening in prison sentences from victim impact evidence 36 and,
further, that "articulate" victims were able to gain longer sentence increases than
other victims. An interesting methodological question would then arise as to what
made the "articulate" victim more effective. Perhaps the reason that these victims'
requests for harsher sentences were more persuasive than others was simply
because they had a better reason to ask for a longer sentence. Put another way,
maybe "articulate" victims are simply those victims who have been harmed the
most. 131
Even assuming a new study finds a unique "articulateness" factor unrelated to
the merits of the case, this sort of difference is hardly unique to victim impact
evidence. Indeed, if taken to its logical conclusion, an articulateness objection
would probably require the nation's court systems to be closed down. As Paul
Gewirtz has recognized, "If courts were to exclude categories of testimony simply
because some witnesses are less articulate than others, no category of oral
testimony would be admissible."1 38 Justice White's powerful dissenting argument
in Booth went unanswered and remains unanswerable: "No two prosecutors have
exactly the same ability to present their arguments to the jury; no two witnesses
have exactly the same ability to communicate the facts; but there is no requirement
. . . that the evidence and argument be reduced to the lowest common
denominator."'
' 39
Consider one obvious example of evidence that we allow even though it may
vary in persuasiveness for reasons unrelated to the merits of the case. Current
rulings from the Supreme Court invite defense mitigation evidence from a
defendant's family and friends, despite the fact that some defendants may have
135 See supra note 105-106 and accompanying text.
136 The hypothetical study could also find a shortening in sentences from victim impact
evidence. Not every victim wants a harsher criminal penalty, a point defense attorneys would do well
to bear in mind. See Benji McMurray, The Mitigating Power of a Victim Focus at Sentencing, 19
FED. SENT'G REP. 125, 127 (2006); Beloof, Third Model, supra note 61, at 302. "Studies suggest that
most victims are far less vengeful and punitive than most lawyers assume." Stephanos Bibas &
Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J.
85, 137 (2004); see also Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 15, 17-18, 24-25. Indeed, even in capital cases, some
victims' representatives may argue for a lengthy prison sentence rather than a death sentence. See,
e.g., Lynn v. Reinstein, 68 P.3d 412, 413-14 (Ariz. 2003). But cf Chalmers et al., supra note 68, at
363 (finding no evidence that victim impact statements influence sentences in a downward direction
in Scotland).
137 Cf Myers et al., supra note 103, at 2393 (discussing mock juror study of victim impact
statements finding level of harm significantly affected sentencing judgments).
138 Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 863, 882
(1996).
139 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 486, 518 (1987) (White, J., dissenting).
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more or less articulate acquaintances. In Payne, for example, the defendant's
parents testified that he was "a good son" and his girlfriend testified that he "was
affectionate, caring, and kind to her children.""14 In another case, a defendant
introduced evidence of having won a dance choreography award while in prison.'14
Surely this kind of testimony, no less than victim impact statements, can lead to
disparate treatment of defendants based on the relative articulateness and
persuasiveness of their family and friends;142 yet, it is routinely allowed.
Given that our current system allows almost unlimited mitigation evidence on
the part of the defendant, an argument for equal justice requires, if anything, that
victim statements be allowed. Equality demands fairness not only between cases,
but also within cases. 43  Excluding victim impact evidence would lead to
tremendous unfairness-both actual and perceived-by creating a sentencing
system with "one side muted."' 44 The Tennessee Supreme Court stated the point
bluntly in its decision in Payne, explaining:
It is an affront to the civilized members of the human race to say
that at sentencing in a capital case, a parade of witnesses may praise the
background, character and good deeds of Defendant... without
limitation as to relevancy, but nothing may be said that bears upon the
character of, or the harm imposed, upon the victims.
45
With haunting eloquence, a father whose ten-year-old daughter, Staci, was
murdered, explained why victims should be heard. Before the sentencing phase
began, Marvin Weinstein asked the prosecutor for the opportunity to speak to the
jury because the defendant's mother would have the chance to do so. The
prosecutor replied that Florida law did not permit this. Here was Weinstein's
response to the prosecutor:
What? I'm not getting a chance to talk to the jury? He's not a defendant
anymore. He's a murderer! A convicted murderer! The jury's made its
decision.... His mother's had her chance all through the trial to sit there
and let the jury see her cry for him while I was barred. 146 ... Now she's
140 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 826 (1991).
141 See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 382 n.5 (1990).
142 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664-67 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing
decisions allowing such varying mitigating evidence on equality grounds).
143 See Gewirtz, supra note 138, at 873-74 (developing this position); see also PRESIDENT'S
TASK FORCE ON ViCInMs OF CRIME, supra note 3, at 16 (asserting that for laws to be respected, they
must be just-not only to the accused, but to victims as well); Beloof, Third Model, supra note 61, at
291-92 (noting that fairness within cases is part of a third model of criminal justice).
'44 Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON
VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 3, at 76-77; Gewirtz, supra note 138, at 873-74.
145 State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990), aff'd, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
146 Weinstein was subpoenaed by the defense as a witness and therefore required to sit outside
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getting another chance? Now she's going to sit there in that witness
chair and cry for her son, that murderer, that murderer who killed my
little girl!
Who will cry for Staci? Tell me that, who will cry for Staci? 47
What then of Hoffman's other argument: that jurors will base their decision
on individual characteristics of victims, drawing distinctions between "worthy"
and "unworthy" victims (or, more colorfully, "nice" people and "not nice" people).
Here again, the critics of victim impact statements are making an empirical
claim-without supporting empirical evidence. And there is good reason to think
no such supporting evidence will ever emerge. Nothing in real-world victim
impact statements suggests any support of comparative conclusion. Sue
Antrobus's victim impact statement never argues, for example, that Vanessa Quinn
was somehow the "best" daughter in the world--only that Vanessa was her
daughter, a unique person, a person who ought to be considered in imposing
sentence. As the Supreme Court explained in Payne:
[V]ictim impact evidence is not offered to encourage comparative
judgments of this kind-for instance, that the killer of a hardworking,
devoted parent deserves the death penalty, but that the murderer of a
reprobate does not. It is designed to show instead each victim's
"uniqueness as an individual human being".... 148
A particularly poignant illustration of why victim impact evidence applies to
all victims-not just "nice" victims-comes from the Supreme Court's pre-Payne
decision of South Carolina v. Gathers, which (following the holding in Booth)
excluded victim impact evidence about a murder victim. The victim was an out-
of-work, mentally-handicapped man who lived in a park-a "homeless person" in
the current vernacular. The prosecutor referred to the victim (who was referred to
by his friends as "Reverend Minister") as follows:
Reverend Minister Haynes, we know, was a very small person. He had
his mental problems. Unable to keep a regular job. And he wasn't
blessed with fame or fortune. And he took things as they came along.
He was prepared to deal with tragedies that he came across in his life.
• . . You will find some other exhibits in this case that tell you more
about a just verdict. Again this is not easy. No one takes any pleasure
the courtroom. See SHAPIRO & WEINSTEIN, supra note 96, at 215-16. For a discussion of the issues
surrounding a victim's right not to be excluded from trials, see generally Douglas E. Beloof & Paul
G. Cassell, The Crime Victim 's Right to Attend the Trial: The Reascendant National Consensus, 9
LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 481 (2005).
147 SHAPIRO & WEINSTEIN, supra note 96, at 319-20.
148 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991).
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from it, but the proof cries out from the grave in this case. Among the
personal effects that this defendant could care little about when he went
through it is something that we all treasure. Speaks a lot about Reverend
Minister Haynes. Very simple yet very profound. Voting. A voter's
registration card.
Reverend Haynes believed in this community. He took part. And
he believed that in Charleston County, in the United States of America,
that in this country you could go to a public park and sit on a public
bench and not be attacked by the likes of Demetrius Gathers. 149
The Supreme Court concluded that this argument was improper under Booth. But
it made no claim that this was some sort of "comparative worth" argument by the
prosecutor; rather, it simply asserted that the evidence did not (in the eyes of the
court) bear on "the defendant's moral culpability.' 50  But Justice O'Connor's
response that prosecutors ought to be able to "convey[] to the jury a sense of the
unique human being whose life the defendant has taken' 151 seems, for the reasons I
have tried to convey here, far more persuasive.
D. The Claim That Permitting Victim Impact Statements in Mass Victim Cases
Creates a "Competition of Victimhood."
Professor Wayne Logan recently raised one last objection to victim impact
statements worth considering. He draws on recent "mass killing" trials to see how
victim impact evidence has worked in practice. Looking at United States v.
McVeigh, United States v. Nichols, United States v. Bin Laden, and United States
v. Moussaoui, he contends that in such trials, a "competition of victimhood" ensues
in which personal differences among victims are accentuated. 52 In cases with a
large number of victims, "there naturally comes a greater prospect for differing
sentiments on the propriety of capital punishment."'' 53  Not only will the
Government favor victim-witnesses who support capital punishment, but "[w]ith
mass killings, the government necessarily must choose from among many potential
witnesses."15 4 This selection process has the obvious potential, Professor Logan
observes, to alienate those victims not selected. Finally, Logan points out that not
every mass killing case will lead to a death penalty-with the life sentences for
Oklahoma City bomber Terry Nichols and 9/11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui
serving as illustrations. These life sentences, after much victim-impact evidence
149 South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810 (1989).
150 Id. at 812.
151 Id. at 817 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152 Wayne A. Logan, Confronting Evil: Victims' Rights in an Age of Terror, 96 GEO. L.J. 721,
749 (2008).
5 Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 750.
642 [Vol 6:611
2009] IN DEFENSE OF VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS 643
presented by the Government in an effort to obtain a death sentence, can be seen
"as a personal betrayal of VIE witnesses, perversely serving to diminish, in a most
public manner, the memory of victims and the enormous hardship suffered."
155
Professor Logan raises these points not as mere practical problems to be
worked through, but rather as undermining the legitimacy of victim impact
evidence in mass killing cases (and, he impliedly suggests, in every capital
homicide case).' 56 But, as with other critics of victim impact evidence, he never
convincingly explains why we ought to treat victim impact statements differently
in some particular subset of criminal cases. For example, even a routine fraud
prosecution can reveal troublesome "personal differences among victims." Some
victims may want the swindler to serve a lengthy prison sentence, while others
may prefer to have him on probation and working to pay restitution more
quickly. 157 Yet in this country we uncontroversially allow victims to be heard in
fraud cases, counting on the sentencing judge to make what accommodations are
possible for multiple victims and then to consider the competing concerns and
impose an appropriate sentence.
To be sure, mass killing cases can create trial management issues because the
sheer number of victims may require some winnowing of the number who will
speak. But these issues are not unique to mass killing cases (mass fraud cases
present them more commonly), and judges have tools to deal with these issues.1
58
If as a result of this selection process some victims are allowed to speak while
others are not, it may cause some interpersonal stress or alienation from the
process. Against this cost side of the ledger, however, must be assayed the many
positive benefits of allowing victims to speak. 1
59
Perhaps more important, Professor Logan's recommended cure for these
problems is far worse than the disease. Based on the problems that he sees in
victim impact evidence in capital cases, Professor Logan suggests that victims
should not be heard at all in the criminal process. But recognizing that this
silencing of victims creates its own harms, he then suggests that they should be
able to speak in a "commission-like forum' 60 similar to truth and reconciliation
commissions that have been used following atrocities in Sierra Leone, Cambodia,
and (most prominently) South Africa. 16  What the victims would do before this
155 Id. at 751. They can also be seen as a refutation of the claim, discussed earlier in this
article, that victim impact statements will inevitably overwhelm a jury and lead to a death sentence.
See supra Part IV.B (discussing whether emotion from victim statements overwhelms sentencers).
156 Logan, supra note 152, at 774.
157 Cf McMurray, supra note 136, at 125 (raising this possibility).
... See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2) (Supp. V 2005) (allowing judges to adopt reasonable
approaches to victim issues in mass victim cases).
159 See supra Part III.B (describing benefits victims derive from giving victim impact
statements).
160 Logan, supra note 152, at 774.
161 See Olivia Lin, Demythologizing Restorative Justice: South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and Rwanda 's Gacaca Courts in Context, 12 ILSA J. INr'L & COMP. L.
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Commission Professor Logan leaves unexplained. Presumably he envisions that
they would have an opportunity to make a "record" of the crime and to expiate the
crime's effects by testifying there.
But even agreeing to these might be viewed as benefits from the proposal, the
downsides appears far more significant. The victims would, no doubt, be quite
frustrated at being diverted there-away from the criminal trial court that makes
substantive sentencing decisions and, indeed, away from the defendant himself.
Such a "commission-like forum" would actually bear little resemblance to, for
example, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. That
Commission was designed to be the initial and exclusive forum for handling most
testimony. The Commission required prospective criminal defendants to appear
personally to make "full disclosure" of their crimes, in exchange for which they
were granted amnesty.' 6 2 Victims had an opportunity to participate in this process
and challenge the version of the facts presented by perpetrators. 163 None of this
dialog seems likely to occur before the secondary forum Professor Logan
envisions, as the defendant would have no reason to ever go there after completing
his criminal trial. And witnesses, too, might find little reason to rehash their
previous sworn trial testimony, particularly because their forum statements could
do nothing to punish the defendant but might serve as the basis for the defendant
seeking a new trial on grounds of "inconsistencies." Finally and most
fundamentally, as Logan himself seemingly recognizes, the model of reconciliation
commissions is not a good one for handling mass killings, as "reconciliation is
often neither desired nor appropriate as an exclusive response.", 64
Professor Logan's ideas are well-intentioned and thoughtfully advanced. But
victims likely would view his proposal as hustling them off to some sort of feel-
good, international bureaucracy, a clear recipe for inflicting "secondary harm" on
them. One of the animating purposes of the victims' rights movement has been to
give victims a meaningful voice in the criminal justice process, to avoid adding
procedural insult to the substantive injury that the criminal has already inflicted.165
Victims suffer when they are told that, unlike the defendant and his family, they
will not be permitted to take part in a criminal trial. 166 This trauma stems from the
41 (2005).
162 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Amendment Act 87 of 1995 s. 19,
available at http://www.info.gov.za/acts/1995/a87-95.pdf.
163 See Albert L. Sachs, Honoring the Truth in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 799, 805 (2001) (giving the example of Steven Biko's family challenging the version of
his death presented by police officers).
'(A Logan, supra note 152, at 774.
165 See Beloof, Third Model, supra note 61, at 294 (explaining the concept of "secondary
harm"); see also Douglas E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims' Interests in Judicially Crafted
Criminal Procedure, 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 1135, 1151 (2007).
166 For a general discussion of the harms caused by disparate treatment, see LINDA E. LEDRAY,
RECOVERING FROM RAPE 125 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that it is important in the healing process for the
rape victims to take back control from rapist and to focus their anger towards him); LEE MADIGAN &
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fact that the victim perceives that the "system's resources are almost entirely
devoted to the criminal, and little remains for those who have sustained harm at the
criminal's hands."' 67 As two noted experts on the psychological effects of crime
have concluded, failure to offer victims a chance to participate in criminal
proceedings can "result in increased feelings of inequity on the part of victims,
with a corresponding increase in crime-related psychological harm."' 68  On the
other hand, there is mounting evidence that "having a voice may improve victims'
mental condition and welfare."'' 69 For some victims, making a statement helps
restore balance between themselves and the offenders. 170 Others may consider it
part of a just process or may want "to communicate the impact of the offense to the
offender."'
17
'
Professor Logan is quite right to raise the concern that the current process of
picking and choosing which of hundreds of victims get to make an oral statement
in a mass victim criminal case can be "emotionally harmful."' 172 No doubt it is
because of this concern that federal prosecutors have been extraordinarily
thoughtful about this process. For example, in the Moussaoui case (involving the
so-called "twentieth 9/11 hijacker"), they sought to present in court a "reasonable
sample" of victim impact witnesses "to convey properly the devastation caused on
that infamous day."'173 As the prosecutors described it to the court, the sample was
designed to be representative across a number of different dimensions:
NANCY C. GAMBLE, THE SECOND RAPE: SOCIETY'S CONTINUED BETRAYAL OF THE VICTM 97 (1991)
(noting that during arraignment, survivors "first realized that it was not their trial, [and] that the
attacker's rights were the ones being protected."); Beloof, Third Model, supra note 61, at 294-96
(explaining that victims are exposed to two types of harms: the first from crime itself, and the second,
from the criminal process); Deborah P. Kelly, Victims, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 69, 72 (1987) (noting that
"victims [want] more than pity and politeness; they [want] to participate"); Marlene A. Young, A
Constitutional Amendment for Victims of Crime: The Victims' Perspective, 34 WAYNE L. REv. 51, 58
(1987) (discussing ways in which victims feel aggrieved from unequal treatment).
167 Task Force on the Victims of Crime and Violence, Executive Summary: Final Report of the
APA Task Force on the Victims of Crime and Violence, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107, 109 (1985).
168 Dean G. Kilpatrick & Randy K. Otto, Constitutionally Guaranteed Participation in
Criminal Proceedings for Victims: Potential Effects on Psychological Functioning, 34 WAYNE L.
REV. 7, 19 (1987) (collecting evidence on this point); see also Ken Eikenberry, The Elevation of
Victims' Rights in Washington State: Constitutional Status, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 19, 26-32 (1989)
(studying positive impacts of Washington's victims' rights constitutional amendment); Erez, Big Bad
Victim, supra note 49, at 550-51 ("The cumulative knowledge acquired from research in various
jurisdictions . . . suggests that victims often benefit from participation and input."); Jason N.
Swensen, Survivor Says Measure Would Dignify Victims, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Oct. 21,
1994, at B4 (noting anguish widow suffered when denied chance to speak at sentencing of husband's
murderer).
169 Erez, Big Bad Victim, supra note 49, at 552.
170 See id..
171 Id. at 551; see also S. REP. No. 105-409, at 17 (1998) (finding that victims' statements have
important "cathartic" effects).
172 Logan, supra note 152, at 749.
173 Government's Motion Pursuant to the "Justice for All Act" at 3, United States v.
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The representative sample includes a cross-section from each of the four
flights .... Moreover, the representative sample includes a diversity in
terms of race, religion, economic status and occupation, and also in terms
of relationship to the victim (i.e., spouse, parent, sibling, child, friend,
etc.). The representative sample also includes victims who were injured,
representing the thousands injured during the attacks. 174
To expand the participation of victims, the Moussaoui prosecutors also introduced
into evidence a large poster with photos of decedents and four notebooks
containing 408 letters from victims and survivors.1
75
The process used in cases like Moussaoui may not be perfect; but it is
certainly better than a process that denies any role to any victim. For example,
Professor Logan cites the experience of Marsha Kight, whose daughter was
murdered by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols in the Oklahoma City
bombing. 176 She did not favor the death penalty for McVeigh, so the Government
did not select her as one of the victim impact witnesses it presented at the penalty
phase of McVeigh's trial. Ms. Kight's experience, contends Professor Logan,
shows the marginalization of some (anti-death penalty) crime victims. But the
only thing worse than marginalizing some crime victims is marginalizing all
victims. When I asked Ms. Kight (my former pro bono client) what she thought of
Professor Logan's suggestion that, based on her case, no victims should be heard at
the penalty phases of capital cases, she responded: "Eliminating victim impact
statements due to my being disallowed to make such a statement recalls the 'baby
with the bath water' clich6. Should all victims be punished because I was
punished?"'
177
No doubt mass killing cases and other mass victim cases will present
challenges in administering victims' rights. Prosecutors, courts, and victims
organizations will have to wrestle with seemingly mundane questions of how to
get victims notice of court hearings and more substantive questions of which
victims will be allowed to speak in person and which will be remitted to written
victim impact evidence. But Professor Logan and other critics of victim impact
evidence have yet to make a convincing case for silencing all victims, in mass
killing sentencings or otherwise.
Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Dec. 6, 2005).
174 id.
175 Logan, supra note 152, at 740.
176 Id. at 749 n.198; see also supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing Marsha Kight's
book regarding the Oklahoma City bombing).
177 E-mail from Marsha Kight to author (Sept. 10, 2008) (on file with author).
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V. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, I believe that the critics of victim impact statements
have it wrong and the nation's elected representatives have it right: crime victims
should have the opportunity to provide a victim impact statement at sentencing.
But to conclude, I want to return briefly to the story of Sue Antrobus. Was she
allowed to give a victim impact statement at the sentencing of the man who
criminally sold the murder weapon used to kill her daughter Vanessa?
Since the prosecution was being handled in federal court, the federal victims'
rights law (the Crime Victims' Rights Act) applied. This law gives crime victims
(and, if they are deceased, their representatives) the right to be "reasonably heard
at ... sentencing."' 78 In Sue's case, no doubt existed that she and her husband Ken
were Vanessa's representatives. But was Vanessa a "crime victim"? Obviously,
when Sulejman Talovic murdered her, she was a victim of his crime. But he was
never prosecuted, as an off-duty police officer managed to kill him on the night of
the massacre. So the only criminal prosecution was for Hunter's illegal sale of the
murder weapon to Talovic. Was she a victim of that crime?
The Crime Victims' Rights Act defines a "victim" as a "person directly and
proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense.'
' 79
Vanessa was "directly" harmed by Hunter's crime when the handgun he illegally
sold was used to kill her. Whether she was "proximately" harmed by the crime is
the sticking point.' 80 In the district court, her pro bono lawyers argue that the term
should be interpreted consistently with notions of "proximate" cause in tort law.
Basic tort law principles permit a defendant to be held accountable for actions that
lead to a crime by another person where the defendant could reasonably foresee
that crime. Given that Hunter and Talovic apparently talked about a bank robbery
during the sale of the weapon, Sue Antrobus's lawyers argued that foreseeability of
misuse of the gun was established.
The district court, however, saw things differently:
The actions of Talovic were an independent, intervening cause which
broke the necessary chain of causation. While the court does not want to
minimize in any way the harm suffered by those who were killed,
injured, or had loved ones killed or injured by Talovic, that harm is not
sufficiently connected to Hunter's offense of unlawfully selling a firearm
to a minor for this court to consider Hunter's actions to be the direct and
proximate cause of the harm.'
8
'
178 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (Supp. V 2005).
179 18 U.S.C. § 377 1(e) (Supp. V 2005) (emphasis added).
180 See generally Andrew Nash, Note, Victims By Definition, 85 WASH. L. REv. 1419 (2008)
(discussing definition of "victim" in the CVRA).
181 Memorandum Decision & Order at 10, United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07-CR-307-DAK (D.
Utah Jan. 3, 2008).
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The district court therefore held that Vanessa Quinn was not a "victim" under the
CVRA and that her mother, Sue Antrobus, had no right to give an impact
statement at sentencing.
The district court also recognized (as Sue Antrobus's attorneys had argued)
that it had discretion to hear from Sue Antrobus. The court, however, concluded
that it had already read the materials submitted by her. In view of that "adequate"
understanding of Sue Antrobus's position, the court found no need to exercise its
discretion in favor of allowing her to speak. 182 The district court then sentenced
Hunter to fifteen months in prison, at the low end of the applicable Guideline
range. And Sue Antrobus was not able to speak.
I believe that the district court erred in concluding that Sue Antrobus's
daughter was not a victim of the illegal sale of the handgun used to murder her. I
argued this point to the Tenth Circuit on appeal, 183 explaining why Hunter should
have been held accountable for the harm that his crime caused. The Tenth Circuit
recently dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, but suggested that Sue
Antrobus could take up the issue again in the district court in light of newly-
revealed evidence from the Government that Hunter and Talovic had talked about
bank robbery during the sale of the gun. 184 Other lawyers and I then filed a motion
to have the issue reopened before the district court, a motion that was ultimately
unsuccessful. 1
8 5
But in concluding this article, I want to focus on the district court's
remarkable conclusion that there was no need to exercise its discretion to allow
Sue to speak because it already understood her position. This is a crabbed view of
the purposes of victim impact statements-assuming they exist solely for the
benefit of the court. Instead, as I have tried to explain, victim impact statements
serve broader ends. They not only provide information to judges, but also give
possible therapeutic benefits to victims, educate defendants about the harms of
their crime, and ensure that the sentencing process is viewed as fair by the broader
public. So I will continue fighting for the right of crime victims like Sue Antrobus
to give a victim impact statement at Mackenzie Hunter's sentencing. She deserved
that opportunity even though the courts never gave it to her. And victims all over
this country deserve the right to be heard before judges and juries make final
decisions when they impose a sentence.
182 Id. at 13.
183 See United States v. Hunter, No. 08-4010 (10th Cir. 2008). The Tenth Circuit had earlier
rejected an effort by the Antrobuses to mandamus the district court, concluding that the district
court's decision that Vanessa Quinn was not a "victim" was not "clearly and indisputably" in error,
the standard for mandamus relief. In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008).
184 United States v. Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308 (10th Cir. 2008).
185 See Order, United States v. Hunter, No 2:07-CR-307-DAK (D. Utah Feb. 10, 2009), pet.
denied, In re Antrobus, No. 09-4024 (10th Cir. Feb. 28, 2009).
